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Abstract Engineering education is a key factor in determining the range of engi-
neers’ expertise, the attitude and the behavior of engineers, and the culture of the 
engineering professional community. This chapter is devoted to nuclear engineer-
ing education post-Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. Prior to education itself, 
knowledge and attitudes required of nuclear engineers are firstly discussed, focus-
ing on social aspects of nuclear technology. I emphasize the importance of mutual 
communication with society, not only with the general public but also with experts 
in other fields, by referring to 3 points which are essential for appropriate advance-
ment of nuclear engineering and can be reinforced with mutual communication: 
social legitimacy of nuclear technology, introspection within the nuclear profes-
sional community, and public trust in nuclear technology and the professional 
community. These points are not only needed for smooth utilization of nuclear 
technology, but also, and more importantly, needed for enhancing the safety of 
nuclear technology utilization and advancing nuclear technology to provide more 
benefits and welfare to society. Finally, I propose 4 items for education reform, 
which are mainly designed to make mutual communication with society more 
effective while maintaining a high level of technical expertise: standardization and 
internationalization, transparency and sharing, social-scientific  literacy education, 
and development and evaluation of faculty.
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When an accident or a scandal related to science and technology occurs, education—
especially higher education such as undergraduate-school and graduate-school edu-
cation—often draws social attention. This social reaction is natural because higher 
education is the first opportunity for to-be-experts to gain expertise in a comprehensive 
manner for several years and is thus influential. Indeed, engineers continuously update 
and reinforce their expertise even after the completion of higher education, mostly 
through on-the-job experiences. However, what they learned at the beginning of their 
professional career inevitably affects how they improve their expertise and what they 
learn from the experiences. Therefore, higher education is a key factor in determin-
ing the range of expertise as well as the attitude and the behavior of engineers. It also 
affects the culture of professional community because the culture is constructed by 
collective behaviors and attitudes of community members.
Considering its extensive influence, this chapter presents a discussion on 
nuclear engineering education. However, since the goal of education largely 
depends on human resources required in society, a major part of this chapter is 
devoted to clarifying the knowledge and attitudes required of nuclear engineers, 
especially focusing on social aspects of nuclear technology, as follows.
In Sect. 20.2, first of all, I look back on some actions on educational reform 
which were carried out in Japan before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. We see 
that Japanese nuclear professionals were aware of the importance of social aspects 
of nuclear technology and then tried to incorporate some relevant contents into 
nuclear engineering education.
Indeed, the importance of social aspects, which often includes communica-
tion with society on science and technology, was recognized not only in nuclear 
engineering but also in other engineering and science fields in those decades. In 
Sect. 20.3, I briefly review why the social aspects were increasingly thought to be 
important with focus on communication with society.
In Sect. 20.4, some key efforts made in relation to social aspects and the com-
munication with society on nuclear technology are introduced. However, I must 
say that these activities hardly brought fruitful results in the reality.
In Sect. 20.5, the causes of the unfruitful results in communication are discussed. 
There was/is often a big gap in the purposes of mutual communication for the gen-
eral public (or society) and for nuclear engineers (or nuclear professional com-
munity): the former expects changes in nuclear engineering and its professional 
community, while the latter expects changes in the general public and society.
In Sect. 20.6, I reconsider the significance of mutual communication in advanc-
ing nuclear engineering. I bring three viewpoints for this: legitimacy, introspec-
tion, and trust. I try to explain that they are requisite to the safe utilization of 
nuclear technology and to the appropriate advancement of nuclear engineering, 
and that they are underpinned by mutual communication with society. Here, com-
munication with society is extended: not only with the general public but also with 
experts in other science and engineering fields.
36920 Nuclear Engineers for Society …
In Sect. 20.7, I discuss what kinds of communication are doable and effective 
in practice.
In Sect. 20.8, I propose 4 ideas on higher education reform based on the discus-
sion given in the previous sections.
Section 20.9 ends this chapter with some concluding remarks.
Finally, before entering the main contents, I would like to briefly introduce my 
educational and professional background. I am a researcher in nuclear materials 
science and engineering. I am interested in both nuclear fission and fusion reac-
tors technology. I received my primary, secondary, and higher education in Japan. 
After them, I worked in a Japanese university for about 6 years at its nuclear engi-
neering department, worked in a U.S. university for 1 year at the materials science 
and engineering department, and now work as an assistant professor at a Korean 
university since 2013 in the nuclear engineering department. Due to this back-
ground, the description in this chapter is centered on Japan’s situation and history. 
Non-Japanese readers may feel some strangeness in the contents. However, based 
on my experience and observation in Japan, U.S., and Korea, I believe that there 
are large similarities in the characters of nuclear expert communities in Asian 
countries and some similarities even between Asian countries and Western coun-
tries, more than expected, because the culture of a nuclear engineering community 
is strongly influenced by the nature of nuclear technology itself.
20.2  Nuclear Education Reform Before the Fukushima 
Daiichi Accident
Before the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there were several initiatives in Japan to 
reform higher education in nuclear engineering. The classical engineering higher 
education predominantly aims to make students acquire natural-scientific and tech-
nological knowledge and skills relevant to nuclear engineering. Here I want to 
introduce an education-reform project undertaken by the Department of Nuclear 
Engineering and Management, the University of Tokyo. The project was named 
“Nuclear Education and Research Initiative” (GoNERI). GoNERI was financially 
supported under the Global Center of Excellence (GCOE) program led by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (MEXT). 
The general objectives of the GCOE program were to “establish education and 
research centers that perform at the apex of global excellence to elevate the interna-
tional competitiveness of the Japanese universities” and to “strengthen and enhance 
the education and research functions of graduate schools, to foster highly creative 
young researchers who will go on to become world leaders in their respective fields 
through experiencing and practicing research of the highest world standard” [1].
GoNERI was selected as one of the GCOE subjects and the program ran during 
FY2007-FY2011. GoNERI aimed to “develop a well-rounded research and educa-
tion program in response to a variety of world-wide nuclear utilization subjects such 
as protection of the global environment, supply of safe and stable nuclear energy, 
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radiation application for healthy, productive and prosperous lives” and to “perform 
the first systematic education on nuclear energy in the world, incorporating the 
social, liberal arts and technical subjects as they relate to nuclear utilization [2].” 
GoNERI specified three realms for education and research, which were nuclear soci-
ology, nuclear energy, and radiation application, and intended to implement them 
into the curriculum in an integrated manner [2]. Among them, “nuclear sociology” 
is of particular interest. It involves nuclear energy law, nuclear non-proliferation, and 
harmonization of technology and society, and puts a special focus on “public under-
standing for harmonization between society and technology” [2].
There was another similar education reform program led by Tokyo Institute of 
Technology in FY2003-FY2007. In its purpose statement [3], “the relationship 
between nuclear energy and society” was frequently mentioned. Considering these 
two reform programs in different universities, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the awareness of the importance of social aspects of nuclear technology, espe-
cially harmonization with society, was widely shared in the nuclear professional 
community. It was recognized that some social-scientific disciplines related to the 
social aspects of nuclear technology should be taught in nuclear engineering edu-
cation. This awareness and recognition must have been brought about by long-last-
ing frictions in society over the utilization of nuclear technology, such as the delay 
in selecting a high-level radioactive waste disposal site.
20.3  Communication on Science and Technology
The importance of social aspects in the development and utilization of science and 
technology has been increasingly recognized not only in the nuclear engineering 
field but also in other science and engineering fields. The cause for this realization 
is the increase of social conflicts related to science and technology, such as environ-
mental problems, ethical concerns in frontier engineering (e.g. genetics), etc. [4].
In this context, two cases immediately draw our attention [4]: the study by Wynne 
[5] on how the general public understands and deals with scientific knowledge about 
environmental contamination in the vicinity of the Sellafield-Windscale site in U.K., 
and the circumstances of U.K.’s government response to the Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) issue [6]. It is explained, for example, that the “deficiency 
model,” which considers that miscommunication and misunderstanding on science and 
technology mainly rest on the deficiency of the citizen’s knowledge, is not plausible in 
many cases [5]. Then, not only the importance of the trust in information of science 
and technology but also the importance of the trustworthiness of an organization which 
deals with the information are claimed [4]. One of the effective ways to foster the trust 
and the trustworthiness is mutual communication between citizens and experts, not one-
way communication from experts to citizens, such as teaching and enlightening. The 
mutual communication may include the reflection of public opinion in the development 
and the utilization of science and technology, public involvement in the decision making 
process for science and technology issues, etc.
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In Japan, the importance of communication on science and technology has been 
clearly recognized since around the year 2000, and methods to collect public opin-
ions via public comment or consensus meeting have been widely implemented [4]. In 
higher education, three universities (The University of Tokyo, Hokkaido University, and 
Waseda University) embarked on education of science and technology communication 
in 2005 under the support of MEXT. For example, The University of Tokyo launched 
a Science Interpreter Training Program [7]. All three universities had a similar moti-
vation, which was that “even though the importance of science and technology in our 
daily lives has increased, the distance between society and science-and-technology has 
been stretched and people’s distrust of science and technology is emerging. So we need 
human resources who can bridge society and science-and-technology” [4].
20.4  Attempts in Nuclear Engineering Community
Regarding public involvement and technology communications in the nuclear engi-
neering field, the Round-Table Conference on Nuclear Power Policy was launched 
by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1996, which aimed to “seek the views 
of all levels and sectors of society in Japan, and to incorporate their diverse opin-
ions as part of future nuclear energy policy” [8]. Public comment and consensus 
meetings were also widely held ancillary to meetings or conferences organized by 
national/local governments or governmental agencies. It can be said that activi-
ties to increase transparency in the decision-making process and to foster public 
involvement in the decision-making process have been formally built up year by 
year. However, when a nuclear-related topic is the agenda, it seemed that both pros 
and cons become extreme, and they do not reach any agreement. For example, at 
the round-table conferences, it was frequently observed that the participants for 
nuclear technology tried to persuade the citizens. In addition, it is often criticized 
that such an activity is utilized as mere “evidence” of public involvement [9].
In the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ), which most Japanese nuclear 
professionals belong to, social aspects of nuclear technology were also recognized 
as a key issue. Such recognition was materialized as the foundation of the Social 
and Environmental Subcommittee (SES) in AESJ in 1999. The prospectus of the 
subcommittee was set as follows [10]:
… A significant relationship with society is a notable characteristic of atomic energy tech-
nology, and the Society and Environment Subcommittee was established to engage in 
academic research of social aspects, as well as to exchange and disseminate the resulting 
information.
We analyze the features and the characteristics of nuclear technology from the view-
point of technological theory and cultural theory. We study various aspects of nuclear 
energy which appears in realms of politics, economics, laws, society, international rela-
tions, environmental harmonization, etc. Then, we search for nuclear technology which 
is adjusted so as to go well with the age of competition, global environmental concerns, 
post-cold war and global economics. Namely, we search for an appropriate form of 
nuclear technology under strong correlations between human beings, societies, environ-
ment and technologies….
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This prospectus says that its main objective is to reconsider the roles and meanings 
of nuclear technology in society and to find how nuclear engineering should be, not 
to inform society about nuclear policy nor to promote public acceptance of nuclear 
technology utilization. Communication on nuclear technology is often attempted to 
change the perception of the general public on nuclear technology by modifying the 
way of showing and explaining the technology. In this case, reformation of nuclear 
engineering itself is not taken into account. What the prospectus explains seems con-
trastive to it. To achieve the aims written in the prospectus, releasing information to 
enlighten the general public is clearly insufficient. Instead, nuclear professionals are 
required to listen to and to understand society so that they can reflect the opinions of 
society in the development and the utilization of nuclear technology.
20.5  Unfruitful Results from the Attempts
I became interested in the social aspects of nuclear technology around 2008. At 
least since that time, I saw many research presentations by social-aspects experts 
at biannual meetings of AESJ (Fig. 20.1). This indicates that social-aspects experts 
had secured a certain position in the nuclear professional community. It must have 
made them feel at ease and made technological experts feel free from struggles 
to communicate with society, as the communication was often time-consuming 
and tough for engineers. This new situation, where technological experts can 
focus on their conventional engineering work and social-aspects experts face soci-
ety, seemed to be reinforced in the last decade. The reinforcement is reasonable 
because it was beneficial for both experts. However, I think fruitful results were 
hardly achieved in line with the prospectus of SES.
One of the reasons of the unfruitful outcome is that social-aspects experts were 
prone to turn their faces more toward citizens and less toward nuclear technology 
experts. Most of communication practitioners and social-aspects experts do not have 
enough knowledge and skills about nuclear technology to advance the technology by 
Fig. 20.1  The number of 
papers on the social aspects 
(categorized in general 
issues session), which were 
presented in the biannual 
AESJ meetings since 1998. 
We see a clear increasing 
trend
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themselves. Hence, in order to reflect what they gathered from society on nuclear tech-
nology development and utilization, social-aspects experts should have transferred opin-
ions from society to engineers so that engineers could consider and reflect it in their 
work; however, this was not done sufficiently. Even when mutual communication is 
carried out between citizens and social-aspects experts or communicators, if the accu-
mulated information is not appropriately transferred to engineers, the communication is 
virtually no different from enlightenment-type one-way communication.
In addition, it should be recognized that the opinion of society hardly appears 
on opinion polls or answers to questionnaires, such as agreement rates on “Do you 
agree with nuclear power utilization?” Many data from opinion polls and ques-
tionnaires have been accumulated over these decades. These data are resourceful, 
but the data in raw formats are not significant enough to stimulate engineers so as 
to bring some changes in the technology. Furthermore, such raw data sometimes 
gave engineers misleading perceptions on the opinion of citizens.
For example, after the occurrence of an incident, we nuclear experts are often 
anxious about opinion polls and regard their results as the opinion of citizens. 
Then, when the polls start to become more positive, we engineers often simply 
assume that the public sentiment has recovered and society has forgiven the inci-
dent. However, in most cases, this is not due to forgiveness, but mainly due to 
oblivion because nuclear energy is not the sole agenda for society. Even after the 
opinion polls recover to around the level before the incident, some bad memories 
are deeply and subconsciously inscribed in public minds. Then, when another inci-
dent occurs in the future, society reacts excessively due to the accumulated bad 
records in the past. Such an excess reaction puzzles nuclear engineers and makes 
engineers think that citizens are irrational.1 To avoid such misunderstanding on the 
behavior and the intention of citizens, we engineers should seek out the true opin-
ion and intention of citizens rather than apparent ones.
To extract more true opinion and intention of society, those raw data should be 
carefully and thoroughly studied considering historical, cultural, and political con-
texts, as described in the prospectus of SES. For this, some disciplines in social sci-
ences, and even sometimes humanities and literature, should be useful. However, as 
far as I know, most social-aspects experts in the nuclear professional community 
did not have enough educational background in social sciences.2 Probably partly 
1
 We engineers usually believe that we can improve technology so as to prevent future occurrence 
of mistakes that have happened in the past. Due to this belief, we tend to evaluate the status of the 
engineering as separate from the fact that the mistake happened in the past. On the other hand, 
citizens usually do not separate the current status of engineering from the previous mistakes, 
because the current status is regarded as a point on the line continued from the past and continues 
into the future. In this sense, public reaction is reasonable and rational. The difference from that 
of engineers is mostly how they construct the framework to look at technology advancement.
2
 Although the statistics need to be carefully checked, many social-aspects experts chose their 
focus of expertise in graduate courses and did not receive comprehensive social-scientific educa-
tion in undergraduate courses in Japan.
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due to this, most information shown to nuclear engineers from social-aspects 
experts was not deep enough to motivate nuclear engineers to think about it.
Of course, the problems did not exist only among social-aspects experts but 
also among nuclear engineers. They did not have an attitude of sincerely listening 
to and collaborating with social-aspects experts. As seen in the previous sections, 
nuclear engineers became aware of the importance of social aspects. However, it 
was mostly done in a passive and reluctant manner, and they did not really under-
stand how social aspects are related to nuclear technology. Then, engineers left 
most things about society up to social-aspects experts so that they can be free from 
mutual communication with society.
In summary, I observe two types of miscommunication between nuclear-technol-
ogy experts and social-aspects experts, rather than between social-aspects experts and 
citizens: (1) a quantitative one, which is due to insufficient communication between 
nuclear-technology experts and social-aspects experts, and (2) a qualitative one, which 
is due to the fact that most information provided from social-aspects experts to nuclear 
engineers was not deep enough to stimulate nuclear engineers. Consequently, it may 
even be said that the mutual communication between citizens and nuclear engineers 
was further reduced and the distance between society and nuclear technology could not 
be decreased in the last decade, although frameworks to conduct mutual communica-
tion was nominally established and deployed (Fig. 20.2).
Fig. 20.2  Three structures for nuclear technology communications: a enlightenment-type one-
way communication with society, where information as knowledge is transferred from engineers 
(experts) to the general public; b mutual communication with society via social-aspects experts 
(including communicators), where miscommunication occurred between social-aspects experts and 
nuclear engineers; c an effective mutual communication with society which I propose in this chapter
37520 Nuclear Engineers for Society …
20.6  Is Communication Essential for Advancing  
Nuclear Engineering?
There is no doubt that nuclear engineers recognize the importance of social 
aspects including mutual communication with society, as can be seen in the edu-
cation reform programs, the round table discussions, and the establishment of the 
SES subcommittee in AESJ. However, in reality, it is not completely clear or con-
vincing for engineers whether mutual communication will really contribute to the 
safe utilization of nuclear technology and the advancement of nuclear engineer-
ing. This is one of the key reasons why nuclear engineers have not been positively 
involved in mutual communication. Many engineers think that the communication 
does nothing for the performance and advancement of nuclear technology but is 
just required to let the general public know the importance of nuclear technology 
and make them accept nuclear technology. In this sense, the communication with 
society is often considered to be a reluctant obligation and an additional burden for 
engineers, and its purpose to change the public perception.
Citizens usually do not think that they have to change; rather they think engi-
neering or experts (community) as well as the governance of technology need to 
change, especially when they participate in mutual communication. The goal of 
engineers is to change society, while the goal of the general public is to change 
nuclear engineering and the nuclear expert community. Thus, in most events of 
mutual communication, both sides cannot achieve what they want; engineers can-
not foster public acceptance, while the general public cannot have any changes in 
the technology and the expert community so as to make them more acceptable to 
them. Repeating such fruitless communication makes engineers tend to keep a dis-
tance from the communication.
However, when we see the significance of the communication from a different 
direction and appropriately define it, mutual communication with society seems vital 
to safely utilize nuclear technology and to advance nuclear engineering. I hereafter 
discuss this point from three viewpoints: (1) legitimacy, (2) introspection, and (3) trust.
20.6.1  Legitimacy
Historically, the civil use of nuclear technology has not been separable from the 
military use of nuclear technology, politically and socially. Related to this fact, 
there are many features that make nuclear technology distinct from other technolo-
gies. For instance, nuclear non-proliferation has been one of the main international 
political issues after World War II. The transparency on nuclear technology needs 
to be limited. National governments participate deeply in the development and uti-
lization of nuclear technology under the international non-proliferation regime. 
Nuclear security concerns, which have been largely escalating during this decade, 
also require a decrease in transparency.
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Economically, in comparison with other methods of electricity generation, the 
percentage of initial investment (capital costs) is higher and designing an insur-
ance system is more difficult due to the large uncertainty in calculating possible 
damages from potential accidents, which requires some support from the govern-
ment. There are also issues on waste disposal whose radioactivity lasts a very long 
time, which requires responsible involvement from the government.
Such characteristics of nuclear technology increase government commitment 
to the technology in its development, utilization, and evaluation. It is hard to put 
nuclear technology under a full market mechanism, which can act as a kind of 
screening process for technology in society. If a product does not fit society, the 
product is swept out from the market or is modified so as to become one more 
acceptable to society. In many countries, products made with nuclear technology, 
such as nuclear power plants, are nearly fully detached from the market mecha-
nism. Someone may claim that there are market mechanisms within the nuclear 
industry, like nuclear export competition, bidding in procurement of fuel, etc. 
However, it is competition after the decision for nuclear technology utilization has 
been made by the government or by a semi-governmental utility company in most 
cases. Nuclear power plants are there whichever company wins the contract.
In history, we can find clear traces of such extensive government participation. 
For example, Japan built 1–2 nuclear power reactors every year since the begin-
ning of the introduction of nuclear power in 1960s, until the mid-1990s, when the 
power demand declined because of the economic recession [11]. Partly thanks to 
this, electricity has been stably supplied, the economy rapidly grew, and Japan 
has established and maintained a high standard of technology for the manufac-
ture of nuclear power plants. The long-term steady promotion and development 
were approvingly and proudly related in the field of nuclear engineering educa-
tion before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. However, considering that there have 
been anti-nuclear movements since 1970s, and that the Chernobyl accident in 
1986 stopped new construction of nuclear reactors in most Western countries, it is 
quite unusual to have the steady increase of nuclear power plants in Japan. Such a 
situation would not happen for other engineering products which are put under the 
market mechanism.
While the fleet of commercial nuclear power reactors expanded steadily, 
research and development (R&D) of advanced reactors was not so successful in 
Japan; the development of the advanced thermal reactor (ATR) was not realized, 
and the development of the fast breeder reactor (FBR) did not proceed according to 
expectations in spite of huge R&D outlays [11]. These unsatisfactory R&D results 
seemed to be overlooked, probably because they were a part of national policy.
These facts mean that nuclear technology and its expert community did not go 
through the usual procedure to obtain social legitimacy in comparison with other 
technologies; a pseudo-legitimacy was given and endorsed by the government. 
This may be one of the reasons why nuclear technology has often suffered strong 
negative reactions from society. Most citizens may not necessarily explicitly think 
about the legitimacy issue; however, they may feel some uneasiness in the fact that 
the government, not the citizens, made the decision, different from other products.
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It is hoped that mutual communication with the public will enable its opinions 
to be reflected in the development and utilization of technology, and lead to social 
legitimacy. It should be noted that there must be feedback and adjustment after 
listening to the public; otherwise mutual communication is no different from one-
way communication.
20.6.2  Introspection
Having these historical circumstances, nuclear engineers made light of the opin-
ions of society and citizens, and made much of governmental decisions and the 
harmonization of the professional community. As a result, the nuclear expert com-
munity turned to be inner-looking and closed, regarded as it is as a “nuclear vil-
lage,” “nuclear mafia,” etc.
The Fukushima accident reports [12–14] mentioned that although there were 
some technical issues related to the safety of nuclear power plants, nuclear engi-
neers unconsciously took no measures to deal with those issues. Moreover, many 
of the issues pointed out in the accident reports were relatively easy to be solved 
technologically. For example, although scientific uncertainty existed in risk assess-
ment of tsunami, possible counter measures to tsunami, like increasing the water 
tightness of the reactor building, were technically simple and doable. In addi-
tion, there was no clear indication that the safety measures had been denied due 
to financial reasons [12]. Thus, this problem is not fully technological, but also 
includes some judgment on what needs to be treated. Significant risks were mis-
takenly ignored and considered as non-urgent, which was said to be “out of the 
expectation” [12–14]. The accident reports claimed that this out-of-the-expectation 
mistake resulted from the non-proactive attitude of the power plant owner and 
non-independence and from insufficient competency of regulatory body, both of 
which are largely related to the inward-looking and closed nature of the nuclear 
professional community [12–14].
Indeed, there are facts indicating that some scientists and citizens showed a 
concern about possible damages due to tsunami [12–14]; however, these opinions 
were not valued sufficiently. This indicates that the nuclear professional commu-
nity persisted in their belief in nuclear safety and assessed opinions as to who had 
given the opinion. Of course, it is not wise or fair to judge such a fault after its 
occurrence. In addition, it is a common practice for engineers to prioritize possible 
concerns according to their significance and solve them one by one. However, the 
order of the priority may have been biased and inappropriate from the standard of 
engineering practices.
In order to suppress the inward-looking nature, which comes from intrinsic 
characteristics of nuclear technology as described above, and then to minimize 
adverse effects from it, nuclear professionals should listen to opinions and criti-
cisms from the outside, such as those from citizens and experts in other realms. 
Nuclear professionals need to respect these opinions and criticisms, and then 
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reflect them in their work if needed. This is a kind of introspection function of 
the nuclear professional community so that adverse effects of nuclear technol-
ogy characteristics to engineering itself can be minimized. To achieve this, mutual 
communication with those outside the nuclear professional communities, espe-
cially with experts in other fields, is important.
20.6.3  Trust
Frequent concern has been raised on issues of public trust on nuclear technology 
and the expert community. In the discussion of trust in science and technology 
and in the professional community in general, the decrease in trust of society and 
citizens is often emphasized. Possible reasons for the degradation of trust are anxi-
ety of citizens about the closed expert community and disappointment due to that 
opinions of society not being reflected in the technology utilization and the gov-
ernance of the professional community. Moreover, there is another point that we 
should not miss: not only is there public distrust toward technology, engineers, and 
their community, but also engineers’ distrust toward society and citizens. There 
has been a structure of mutual distrust of each other.
Some engineers may claim that this is because some people and mass-media 
have irrationally criticized engineers and technology due to lack of knowledge 
and a biased standpoint. Indeed, there were a number of cases where the “defi-
cient model” can explain the situation, although we should recognize the insuf-
ficiency of the “deficient model” in many cases. Engineers are also human beings 
after all, and thus painful experiences such as receiving irrational criticisms were 
deeply and subconsciously inscribed in their minds. In addition, it was transferred 
to younger generations via education and as culture.
Consequently, there are quite a few experts who believe that they have to pro-
mote nuclear energy utilization even without endorsement and appreciation from 
society, because they are convinced that nuclear energy is really needed. Some 
experts even ignore skepticism and criticism of citizens, relying on the own belief. 
However, it should be recognized that this attitude is quite inappropriate for pro-
fessional engineers, and that this attitude further enlarges distrust, disappointment, 
and opposition of citizens toward the nuclear professional community.
The trust from the general public may facilitate the utilization of nuclear power 
plants, the site selection of radioactive the waste disposal facility, etc. However, if this 
is all that is intended, trust cannot be achieved in most cases. Rather, more impor-
tantly, public trust is essential for engineers to work positively and proactively. And 
such positive and proactive attitudes are essential for nuclear experts to deal with a 
high-risk technology, which the accident reports require that TEPCO and the regula-
tory body have. In this sense, “trust” can be replaced with “respect.” A professional 
community which is not respected and is not appreciated for its outcome due to dis-
trust and which distrusts the society which they should serve is not a professional 
community which proactively and continuously makes progress so as to increase 
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the safety level. The degree of public trust is an index of the healthiness of the pro-
fessional community. To heighten it, active mutual communication—in practice (1) 
understand public opinion, (2) come up with measures based on it, and (3) show the 
measures to the general public, and then (4) again listen to and understand public 
opinion—is important.
Legitimacy, introspection, and trust are inter-related. Being trusted/respected is 
needed to proactively work, which results in increase of legitimacy. However, due 
to the nature of nuclear technology, there is a driving force that makes the nuclear 
expert community inward-looking more than the other technology communities. 
Thus, an introspective attitude is needed to keep the community open and more 
active, which results in increase of trust and legitimacy. All of these three aspects 
may be underpinned by mutual communication with society including experts in 
other science and engineering fields.
20.7  Effective Communication
20.7.1  Communication with Society and the General Public
Even after recognizing the importance of mutual communication, it is not easy for 
nuclear engineers to understand and catch up with the general public that has different 
beliefs, preferences, cultural backgrounds, and often negative views on nuclear tech-
nologies. Nuclear technology has an intrinsic complexity regarding social context; 
and agreement/disagreement on the technology itself may become a topic of dialogue.
Public opinions are also complex. They cannot be understood by asking sim-
ple questions, such as “Do you support nuclear power utilization?” We nuclear 
engineers should not readily think that we can draw out these opinions ourselves. 
There should be experts who can analyze the raw data from opinion polls and 
interpret them in societal and historical contexts. Such experts are expected to 
indicate what people’s desires and concerns are so that nuclear engineers can uti-
lize the findings in developing their technology.
To realize this, engineers should acknowledge public opinion and have basic 
knowledge of social sciences, which is not the case in the current situation, so that 
they can adequately communicate with experts in these fields. I recognize that this 
is the central motivation for considering nuclear engineering education that high-
lights social-scientific literacy.
20.7.2  Communication with Experts in Other Fields
As nuclear engineering consists of systems engineering, there are many connec-
tions with other disciplines. It is advisable and natural to deepen the communi-
cation with other experts through such connections. In order to activate such 
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communication and collaboration, nuclear engineering needs to be scientifically 
and technologically attractive. However, the level and quality within each sub-dis-
cipline field are not as high as those in its parent field, although a relatively large 
research budget has been funded for nuclear technology utilization and develop-
ment. This could be due to lack of competition and openness. Indeed, pursuing 
scientific originality and frontier research are often incompatible with pursuing 
technology development specialized for nuclear engineering. Nevertheless, it is 
of crucial importance, especially for academia, to recover superiority in scientific 
originality in the nuclear engineering field, for activating competition and commu-
nication with other fields of science and engineering, which will ultimately help 
restore public trust.
20.8  Reform of Education
Most nuclear engineers are not ready to carry out the communication methods 
described in Sect. 20.7 at present. In addition, the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
indicated that even natural-scientific and technological standards of nuclear pro-
fessionals are not adequately high. To improve the situation, nuclear engineering 
education needs to be reformed. I here propose the following 4 reform items.
20.8.1  Standardization and Internationalization
Even if social aspects are essential and need to be taught to nuclear engineers, nat-
ural-scientific and technological knowledge and disciplines are always the core of 
nuclear engineering. Without a high standard of these, nuclear safety cannot be 
ensured, social legitimacy and trust will never be achieved, and mutual communi-
cation and collaboration with experts in other fields cannot be activated. To make 
fulfilling a high standard of technological expertise and cultivating social-scientific 
literacy compatible in nuclear engineering education, the thoroughness and the 
effectiveness of education on the core technological expertise must be adequately 
heightened.
The core technological expertise includes reactor physics, radiochemistry, fluid 
dynamics, materials engineering, nuclear fuel cycle engineering, etc. Although 
these contents are taught as mandatory subjects in most universities, each subject 
may not necessarily be well optimized for each university. For example, when I 
teach materials science related to nuclear materials, even if I am careful, the con-
tents are biased by my expertise and converged around my specific expertise. If the 
contents are common basics and the core for experts, they should not be too biased 
by the expertise of the lecturer but be more generalized and normalized so that 
nuclear professionals can share fundamental expertise independent of universities 
and nations where they have received their education. As an increasing number of 
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countries plan nuclear power plant construction, developing and sharing standard-
ized course materials is also beneficial to maintain the quality of nuclear profes-
sionals all over the world.
20.8.2  Transparency and Sharing
In addition to the core contents, advanced and applied contents are important. In 
this aspect, the feature of each university should emerge. In these contents, a vari-
ety of expertise and knowledge should be maintained. Some contents which let 
students experience trials and errors may be intentionally involved. Here, the most 
important point is to clearly show its pedagogical meaning to students, experts 
inside and outside the community, and to society. There are 3 reasons to do so.
1. Society can see what the nuclear professional community aims at in education. 
The curriculum is a kind of design sheet on how to nurture professionals. To 
show the design sheet is a social responsibility of the university. Responding 
to this accountability also helps to make the purpose of education clearer. It is 
also effective to increase the transparency of the expert community and then 
increase trustworthiness and introspection.
2. Each university can see the educational resources of other universities. As 
scientific disciplines involved in nuclear engineering are vast, it is difficult 
for one university department to sufficiently cover all the necessary subjects. 
If the educational resources are open to other universities, it would foster 
collaboration.
3. Universities can mutually monitor the status of other universities’ (and thus 
other countries’) education. Also experts in other fields can check the educa-
tional conditions. The Fukushima Daiichi accident re-confirmed to us that the 
consequences of nuclear technology including accidents are intrinsically inter-
national. Knowing about the situation of other universities would spur us to 
work hard together with each other, and also would function as introspection. 
This is also a responsibility to nuclear experts in other countries as well as to 
the public in other countries.
20.8.3  Social-Scientific Literacy Education
The importance of understanding the opinion of society was described in above 
sections. For to-be-experts, they first need to realize this importance as their own 
feeling and then recognize that its consideration and reflection are highly impor-
tant to safely utilize nuclear reactors and to advance nuclear engineering. Then, 
they need to cultivate social-scientific literacy through education about engineering 
ethics, philosophy of science, history of science, science and technology and soci-
ety (STS), social psychology, politics, economics, organizational theory, cultural 
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theory, etc. As a result, the ability to collaborate with experts in social sciences as 
well as communicators to engage citizens can be fostered. To my knowledge, most 
nuclear engineering curriculums only include some of these subjects in a piece-
meal fashion. There is no consensus which contents are more relevant and impor-
tant for engineers.
Personally, I believe education on nuclear history is effective. This must involve 
not only positive history such as how nuclear R&D succeeded and technologies 
were developed, but also negative history such as failures in R&D, scandals, acci-
dents, and how mutual distrust between society and engineers have come about. 
As mentioned above, nuclear technology has some unique features that other tech-
nologies do not usually have. Studying and knowing history also reminds us of 
this nature of nuclear technology.
In education of social aspects, international collaboration is also important. On 
societal issues in the community or in the society where one belongs, it is hard to be 
fully objective: sometimes one becomes too critical or too defensive. If the issues are 
of other nations, one can be more objective and keep an appropriate distance from 
the issue. For example, if international collaboration is made on nuclear history edu-
cation, students would discover similarities and differences in these histories, and 
can find that many countries follow the mistakes of advanced countries. Whether 
good cases or bad cases, histories and situations of other countries teach a lot.
20.8.4  Faculty Development and Evaluation
Most education reform attempts focus on evaluation of students: e.g., how many 
times students attended research conferences, what papers were published, etc. 
This is quality control at the exit of an educational system. We should pay more 
attention on the system itself, specifically evaluation of faculty and facilities.
While the speed of social advancement/change has been increasing, the work 
period of an engineer has been extending. Even for nuclear engineering whose 
development speed has become relatively slow, technologies are largely renewed 
within the work period of an engineer. To construct an effective education system, 
it is imperative for the faculty, especially senior faculty, to put themselves in the 
forefront, update their knowledge, and continuously learn. Such activities by fac-
ulty should be systematically supported by the university. When all faculty mem-
bers have such an attitude and update their knowledge as well as their views on 
the role and position of nuclear technology in society, the accumulation of these 
knowledge and views would form the basis of an appropriate education system.
Regarding evaluation of faculty, it should not be so straightforward and simple. 
Although some outsiders should be involved in the evaluation, it cannot be done 
mainly by outsiders. As the complexity of technology increases, indeed due to that, 
the importance of experts and their knowledge is more keenly highlighted, particu-
larly in the case of balancing and managing multiple different disciplines relevant 
to technology utilization. Hence, it is better that the details of faculty development 
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support and faculty evaluation criteria are discussed and determined primarily by 
the nuclear engineering department at each university and then shown to society and 
experts in other fields so as to reflect outsiders’ viewpoints. In the discussion, the 
aforementioned 3 viewpoints, i.e., standardization and internationalization, transpar-
ency and sharing, and social-scientific literacy education, should be considered.
20.9  Concluding Remarks
This chapter was devoted to nuclear engineering education for the post-Fukushima 
Daiichi accident era. Prior to education itself, the knowledge and attitudes required 
of nuclear engineers were discussed with focus on the social aspects of nuclear 
technology.
First of all, we should clearly recognize that nuclear technology has some 
intrinsic differences from general technologies, which come from its relation to 
weapon technology, potential risks of reactor accidents, long-lasting radioactivity 
of spent fuel, etc. Most of these features require government commitment. Thus, 
in most countries, nuclear technology has not achieved much social legitimacy, 
which makes the social context of nuclear technology complex. Consequently, 
we nuclear engineers are required to communicate with society more thoroughly 
and more openly than engineers in other technologies. One may feel that this addi-
tional requirement for nuclear technology is “unfair,” but we should realize it is an 
essential characteristic of nuclear technology.
To achieve social legitimacy, mutual communication with society, which 
includes communication not only with the general public but also with experts in 
other fields, seems vital. In addition to social legitimacy, it is hoped that mutual 
communication will foster an introspective attitude in the professional com-
munity and will help nuclear technology and the professional community regain 
public trust. It must be clearly understood that these points are not only needed 
for smooth utilization of nuclear technology, but also, and more importantly, for 
enhancing the safety of nuclear technology utilization and advancing nuclear tech-
nology to provide more benefits and welfare for society.
Finally, I proposed 4 items for education reform, which are mainly designed to 
make mutual communication with society more effective while maintaining a high 
level of technical expertise: standardization and internationalization, transparency and 
sharing, social-scientific literacy education, and development and evaluation of faculty. 
These ideas are not necessarily concrete, and may be nothing new. Most universities 
may already have taken some actions to materialize these ideas. However, what they 
are doing now is mostly insufficient to fully realize its purpose. If they just think it is 
needed to do so formally or to make their departments look better to attract the next 
generation, its aim may have been achieved. However, if the purpose is to acquire 
social legitimacy, to cultivate an introspective attitude in our community, and to gain 
trust for nuclear technology and the nuclear professional community, the contents are 
far from satisfactory and thus should be redesigned and then reconstructed.
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Most engineers have been deeply involved in responding to the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident for the last 3 years. Now should be the time to deeply consider 
what kind of professionals we want to be and what nuclear engineering education 
should do to achieve it. I hope that this chapter will stimulate discussion in the 
nuclear professional community and draw more attention to nuclear engineering 
education on the part of the general public and experts in other fields.
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